

648 established in southern Manchuria since 1905. and had looked on Inner Mongolia as a Japanese sphere of influence since 1915. When the Chinese Government began contending for supremacy in these areas, the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria took counter-measures to protect Japan's primary source of raw materials.

Chang Tso-lin had been a subservient tool of the Japanese, but his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, defied Japan and worked with the Nanking regime. Japan forced him out of Manchuria and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. Japanese armies added Jehol to their Manchurian kingdom the following year. Attempts were also made to extend control over Chahar and Suiyuan by force and by exploiting Mongolian resentment at Chinese immigration and political control.

648 As none of these moves had encountered
121 firm Chinese resistance, the Japanese military regime in Manchuria invaded Hopei in 1933. Fighting was halted by the Tanku truce of May 25, 1933, by which China agreed to de-militarize the area of Hopei north of a line running roughly just above Peiping and Tientsin. Two years later, the Nationalist Government agreed to withdraw its influence and political organizations from the area. At the same time, Japan forced

648 Nanking to permit the establishment of the East
721 Hopei Autonomous Council and the Hopei-Chahar
Political Council. Although the personnel of
these governments was named by Nanking, their
creation undermined the Nationalist Government's
sovereignty and control while increasing
Japan's military, political, and economic
dominance of North China. This was the
situation in July 1937 when Japanese troops in
the Peiping-Tientsin area clashed with Chinese
troops in Lu-kou-ch'iao outside Peiping and
precipitated the war of resistance against Japan.²²

Although China had considerable armed
strength in the North when Japan launched a
full-scale attack, no determined resistance
took place in Hopei and Shansi as developed
around Shanghai in the early months of the war.

648 By the end of 1937, the main campaign in the
642 two provinces and Inner Mongolia was completed.²³

727 The Provisional Government of the Republic of
China was established as a puppet regime at
Peking in December 1937 with jurisdiction over

22. T.A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York,
The Macmillan Company, 1938, pp. 1-153,
290-316.

23. Ibid.

668 Government's inaction gained sympathy for the Communists among the patriotic elements in North China. A large part of the student group, always to the left of the Kuomintang ideologically, was particularly drawn toward the Communists in their "United Front" phase, and many young people from the universities streamed to the Communist center at Yen-an before and after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.

B. Communism in the Resistance War against Japan

668
721 The first large-scale entry of the Communists into the North China Region occurred during the resistance war against Japan. Their Eighth Route Army moved from Shensi into neighboring Shansi in 1937 to fight the Japanese forces entering the passes along the Great Wall. As the Japanese armies swept south to Taiyuan, the Communist forces remained in northeast Shansi to engage in guerrilla warfare. In January 1938, representatives of the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, Yen Hsi-shan's provincial administration, and other groups established the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region with central government approval to continue the fight against Japan. While the forces of Yen Hsi-shan and the Nationalist Government faced the enemy in southern Shansi, the Eighth Route

- 668 Army carried guerrilla warfare into the rural
• 721 areas of Shansi, Hopei, Chahar, and Jehol,
and central and northern Shansi.³¹

668 Functioning as a collection of separate
701 armed bands rather than as a group, the
Eighth Route Army maintained scattered rural
bases isolated from one another by Japanese
forces concentrated in the cities and along
communication routes. Local peasants and
former students and professors from Peking
and Tientsin were drawn into the army or
trained as an irregular militia guarding the
villages. Because the Communist army
existed behind enemy lines and lacked indepen-
dent finances, it was forced to cultivate the
good will of the local Chinese populace.
Political cadres operating with the army
established local governments, encouraged a
high degree of local participation in them,
lowered the taxes of the poorer peasants,

31. On the Eighth Route Army and the Com-
munist areas see Gunther Stein, The Challenge
of Red China, New York, Whittlesey House,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945, pp. 324,
328-30, and map facing p. 458; White and Jacoby,
op. cit., pp. 199-213; Linebarger, op. cit., pp.
116-23, 159-75; and U.S. Office of Strategic
Services, The Guerrilla Front in North China,
Washington, D.C. 1943.